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Introduction
What an honour it is to deliver the first Innis Christie lecture in labour and
employment law. My career and Innis' developed in parallel. Our very first
publications dealt with tort liability for strikes; our early research dealt
with collective labour law; we worked together on a labour law casebook;
we both shuffled sideways from labour law into administrative law and
lurched from there into legal ethics; we both became labour mediators
and arbitrators and then-a logical progression-deans of law. Finally,
we both worked on government policy studies, starting with the Woods
Task Force in the mid-1960s, though Innis became far more extensively
involved with government than I did.'

University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University. This essay was
originally delivered as the inaugural Innis Christie Lecture at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie
University. I thank Bruce Archibald and his fellow organizers for prescribing the nautical metaphor
around which this lecture and an ensuing conference were organized, and Claire Mummi, Katia Diab
and Robin Lostracco for their able research and editorial assistance.
I. Amongst his many practical contributions to labour law, policy and administration, Innis
Christie chaired the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Tribunal, Workers' Compensation Board and
Labour Relations Board and also served as Deputy Minister of Labour.
*
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On the other hand, in several important respects, our paths diverged.
I tried to light a fire under my law school; Innis burned his down. Innis
was a passionate golfer; I wrote an article on "The Right to Golf." He was
an intrepid sailor; I exhausted my nautical ambitions on the ferry across
Toronto harbour. But the biggest difference between us was this: I got
around to thinking about the plight of individual, unorganized workers just
five or six years ago; Innis taught Canada's first-ever course in employment
law in the early 1970s2 and in 1980, he published the first-ever Canadian
academic treatise on the subject.
It is precisely Innis' pioneering work on the rights of unorganized
workers that inspires the title of my talk this evening: "Charting the
boundaries of labour law." By discovering an unexplored continent of
individual employment law, an ocean away from the known world of
collective labour law, Innis opened up for debate the whole question of
how to redraw the map of labour law so as to accommodate this new and
important discovery. I will address that question. Then I will suggest that
we need a map that is more ambitious yet, one that can accommodate a
multiplicity of continents as yet undiscovered, a plethora of tectonic forces
as yet unimagined. What we need, I argue, is a map of "the law of labour
market regulation."
I. The rise andfall of collective labour law
It is easy to understand why collective labour law preoccupied Canada's
labour policy makers, practitioners and scholars right through the 1960s
when Innis and I began our academic careers. Conflict raged over labour's
claims to a fair share of wealth and power, over the right of workers to
organize, over the implications of collective bargaining for the national
interest in war and peace. This conflict-bitter, emotional, ideological and
sometimes violent-ultimately provoked a major if incomplete experiment
in labour market regulation: our system of compulsory collective
bargaining.4 Given this great societal drama, given the legal and policy
challenges of introducing a new regulatory system, how could politicians,
lawyers and legal academics not be interested in-not be consumed bycollective labour law?

This is not quite accurate. As Innis himself noted, a course in "master and servant law"
2.
was offered at Dalhousie decades earlier. Innis Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980) at 3 citing John Willis, A History of DalhousieLaw School (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1979) at 80.
3. Christie, ibid.
See Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers'Collective
4.
Action in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

Charting the Boundaries of Labour Law

3

However, just when collective bargaining entered its "golden age,"
it seemed to lose its appeal. Or, more accurately, changes in technology,
management strategy, working class consciousness and global political
economy brought the post-war expansion of trade unionism to a halt, and
launched collective bargaining on what has turned out to be forty years of
gradual but uninterrupted decline.' Over time, this decline contributed to
the restructuring of labour law practice, the repudiation by legislatures of
many promising experiments in collective labour law, and ultimately, the
redeployment of scholarly energies to other aspects of labour law. Innis,
of course, was way ahead of the rest of us in detecting this shift, or at least
in noticing the tenuous grip that collective bargaining had on Canadian
workplaces, and the consequent need to supplement or complement it with
what we now call "employment law."
II. The emergence of individualemployment law
I had an early encounter with employment law myself. One of the first
letters I drafted as an articling student read roughly as follows: "Dear
Sir, You have wrongfully dismissed our client, Mr. A. Unless we receive
the sum of $1 mil. by Monday next, we will be obliged to initiate legal
proceedings." To my astonishment, not a penny was received by "Monday
next" nor were legal proceedings initiated by our firm. For obvious reasons:
aggrieved employees, like poor Mr. A, could seldom afford to sue, and
if they could, they were generally well advised not to do so. Common
law doctrine heavily (but not entirely) favoured employers; 6 common
law remedies did not include reinstatement of wrongly discharged
employees;' and damage awards were generally very modest.! Well into
the 20th century, magistrates' and small claims courts-the lowest level
of criminal and civil courts-still dealt with what was then called "master
and servant" law. However, no lawyer ever made much of a living in those
courts; their decisions were seldom-if ever-reported; and until recently,
they received scant attention from scholars. 9
5.
See e.g. Harry Arthurs, Labour Law without the State? (1996) 46:1 UTLJ 1; Harry Arthurs,
"Labour Law After Labour" in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, The Idea ofLabour Law (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2011).
6.
For a general account see e.g. Geoffrey England et al, Employment Law in Canada, 3d ed
(Toronto: Lexis Nexis Canada /Butterworths, 1998) vol I at 1.1 ff; But see also Harry Glasbeek,
"The Contract of Employment at Common Law" in John Anderson & Morley Gunderson eds, UnionManagement Relations in Canada(Toronto: Addison-Wesley, 1982).
See e.g. Red Deer College v Michaels et al, [ 1976] 2 SCR 324 at 15.
7.
See Christie et al, Employment Law in Canada,2d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) at 728, 732,
8.
734 and 801.
9.
But see Douglas Hay & Paul Craven, Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the
Empire, 1562-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
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Thus, for Innis to launch a new law school subject called employment
law in the 1970s was pretty much like making bricks without straw. In
each decade of the 40s and the 50s only about 60 employment law cases
in total were decided by all Canadian superior courts-that is, about six
cases per year; in the 1960s, this number grew somewhat to about 100
over the decade-still on average only one case per province per year.
And even in the 1970s, when Innis began to work in the field, only about
600 cases were decided across the whole country over the entire ten year
period-on average half a dozen cases per year per province. The pace
really only picked up in the 1980s when more than 3,000 employment law
cases were decided. The number has continued to climb ever since.' 0
During the 1970s, and especially the 1980s, it became clear that
qualitative as well as quantitative changes were taking place. Common
law doctrines became more favourable to employees. Judges began to read
worker-friendly terms into employment contracts," to hold employers to
higher substantive and procedural standards when terminating employees
for cause; 2 and to provide employees with more generous damage awards
if these standards were violated.' These developments were chronicled
in (and to some extent prompted by) an outpouring of publications on
employment law-practitioners' texts, guides and handbooks, law school
and continuing education teaching materials, government and think-tank
studies and, of course academic treatises and articles. In the entire sixty
years from 1900 to 1960, less than a dozen books or articles on employment
law were published in Canada-less than two per decade; in the 1960s and
1970s, the pace picked up a little, to a dozen publications per decade; but

These numbers refer only to court decisions dealing with contracts of employment and
10.
with employment standards. They do not include court decisions dealing with human rights and
occupational health and safety; first instance decisions of commissions, tribunals and adjudicators; or
front-line administrative determinations by labour inspectors, workplace committees and other bodies.
They therefore radically understate the overall levels of activity in the field. I am grateful to Claire
Mumm6, PhD candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, for allowing me to refer to the
preliminary results of her study of employment law litigation.
11. See e.g. Cohnstaedt v University of Regina, [1989] 1 SCR 1011 at paras 26-29, [1989] SCJ no
38.
12. See e.g. McKinley v BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38, [2001] 2 SCR 161.
13. See e.g. Wallace v United GrainGrowers Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 701; but see contra Honda Canada
Inc. v Keays 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR 362.
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since 1980, things have changed dramatically: there are now about 100
publications on some aspect of employment law per decade.14
Innis, his co-authors and his students' made a crucial contribution to
these developments by proposing a new regime of protection for Canadian
workers; and they did so just at the moment when it was becoming clear
that collective bargaining was going into decline. In fact, as we all know,
collective labour law never covered as many workers as individual
employment law. Even in its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, collective
labour law covered only some 40 per cent of the Canadian workforce; the
rights of the other 60 per cent were determined by individual employment
law; and this disparity grew as union density shrunk to its current level,
well below 30 per cent.'"
However, I do not mean to suggest that employment law has lived up
to its early promise either. The common law of the employment contractthe heart and soul of what we have come to call "employment law"never provided rank-and-file workers with satisfactory protection, and still
does not. Rather it appears primarily to benefit a relatively thin stratum
of relatively highly-paid professional, managerial, sales and technical
employees." This is hardly surprising. Unlike my poor Mr. A and other
rank-and-file workers, the latter can afford to sue; they make higher
salaries and therefore stand to recover higher damages if they win their
case; and they also benefit from an odd common law doctrine that entitles
them to calculate their damages using a more generous formula than the
one rank-and-file workers must use.'"
Still, if developments in the common law of employment provided
little practical benefit to ordinary workers, they certainly created a whole
new market niche for lawyers. On the one hand, lawyers identified a
14. These numbers include all English-language handbooks, guides, teaching materials, treatises
and articles on employment law, wrongful dismissal and labour standards legislation and may be
somewhat inflated because multiple editions of the same publication are included as individual items.
On the other hand, they do not include publications relating to employment discrimination, workers'
compensation or occupational health and safety. I am grateful to Katia Diab, JD candidate, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, for her assistance in identifying these publications.
15. Academics who graduated from the "Christie school" of labour and employment law include
Bruce Archibald, Brent Cotter, Geoffrey England, Brian Langille, Lorraine Lafferty, Michael Lynk,
Michael MacNeil and Dianne Pothier.
16. OECD, Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, Trade Union Density in OECD
Countries1960-2008, online: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,3425,en_ 2649_33927
39891562 Il 1 l,00.html>.
17. See e.g. England et al, supranote 6 at 1.10.
18. Cronk v CanadianGeneral Insurance Co, [1995] 25 OR (3d) 505, 128 DLR (4th) 147; Donald
D Carter, "Calculating the Length of Reasonable Notice: Has Cronk Made a Difference?" (1998)
6 CLELJ 421; G England, "Determining Reasonable Notice of Termination at Common Law: The
Implications of Cronk v CanadianGeneral Insurance Co." (1996) 4 CLELJ 115.
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new, affluent clientele to whom they marketed their services through
publications, conferences and newsletters;19 on the other, they helped to
reshape the contractual provisions, legal doctrines and conventions of
compensation that constitute the substantive norms of this field of law. 20
I wish I could also report that employment law flourished as rapidly
amongst academics as it did amongst practitioners. However, I am afraid
that we law professors were slower off the mark. In part, our reluctance
to teach or write about employment law can be explained by a nearconsensus in academe that the best way to protect workers was to help
them to gain access to collective bargaining. 21 Only when the promise
of collective bargaining began to fade did we begin to look seriously at
the alternatives-in particular at employment standards, health and safety,
workers' compensation and anti-discrimination statutes enforced by
labour ministries, inspectorates and tribunals. Until then, as Judy Fudge
memorably observed, with the honourable exception of Innis, and his
former students and collaborators, we generally treated employment law as
"labour law's little sister" 22-as an un-sexy field unworthy of the attention
of serious scholars-despite the fact that it provided the only practical
protections for many women and immigrants, for the unskilled and poorly
educated and for other vulnerable worker populations. However, a second,
more mundane consideration also delayed the growth of an academic
discipline of employment law. Law professors tend to teach subjects only
if they can find "teachable" cases 23 or other thought-provoking materials.
However, few such employment law cases were decided until the 1970s
and, as noted, hardly any Canadian secondary literature was published
until the 1980s.

19. See e.g. L Edelman, S Abraham & H Erlanger "The Professional Construction of Law: The
Inflated Threat of Wrongful Dismissal" (1992) 26 Law & Soc'y Rev 47.
20. See e.g. Daphne Taras, "The Micropolitics of Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd." in J Fudge
and E Tucker, eds, Work on Trial: Canadian Labour Law Struggles (Toronto: Irwin Law/Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010).
21. The consensus was not complete. Critical scholars expressed doubts early on that collective
bargaining could or would liberate workers from the subordination that informed classical master
and servant law. See e.g. H Glasbeek, "The Utility of Model Building-Collins' Capitalist Discipline
and Corporatist Law" (1984) 13:1 Ind Law J 133 at 142-43; Judy Fudge, "Fragmenting Work and
Fragmenting Organizations: The Contract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation"
(2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 609 at paras 24-26.
22. Judy Fudge, "Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law's Little Sister and
the Feminization of Labour" (1991) 7 J L & Soc Pol'y 73.
23. As late as 1948, a distinguished Oxford academic solemnly complimented his own university for
excluding from its curriculum "branches of law that depend on Statute and not on precedent." WTS
Stallybrass, Law in the Universities (1948) 1 J Soc'y Pub Tchrs L (n.s.) 157 at 163.
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III. Labourlaw is a subset of employment law
Whatever the reasons, then, it is clear that employment law only emerged
as field of professional practice in the 1970s and as an academic subdiscipline in the 1980s, thanks largely to Innis. What relation employment
law bore to the rest of labour law is the question I want to pose next. In the
preface to the first edition of Employment Law, Innis defined his subject as
"the non-collective aspect of what standard English texts refer to as labour
law."2 4 This definition appears to sharply differentiate the individual
from the collective aspects of labour law. However, as Innis made clear
elsewhere, this differentiation was driven by editorial considerations,
rather than a desire to keep the various elements of labour law analytically
or functionally distinct.25 Not only are there points of intersection and
overlap between collective and individual law; not only do the two inform
and influence each other; but as Innis' former student and then-colleague,
Brian Langille, argued in an important early article, "labour law is a subset
of employment law." 26 Like Brian, Innis himself strongly endorsed the
proposition that collective and individual labour law are both indispensable
to the larger project of ensuring justice in employment relations. 27 In this
part of my lecture, I aim to explore the implications of their shared insight.
Let me start this way. Labour law is about workers. However, workers
do not arrive on the labour market with "individual" or "collective"
stamped on their foreheads, nor do they secrete an antibody that guarantees
they will remain employees rather than become "self-employed,"
"unemployed" or "precariously employed." Thus in the 1950s and 1960s,
many workers governed by individual employment contracts joined unions
and became subject to collective bargaining law; in the 1970s, as union
density declined, many moved in the opposite direction, from collective
to individual regimes; and since the 1980s there has been a significant
shift from full-time long-term standard employment arrangements to selfemployment and to part-time, short-term, agency and other non-standard
arrangements 2 8-most of which provide workers with fewer rights and
24. Christie, supra note 2 at vii.
25. Ibid at 2-3. This theme was the subject of lengthier treatment in the second edition by Innis and
his co-editors, Geoffrey England and Brent Cotter. See Christie et al, supra note 8 at xi-xii.
26. Brian Langille, "Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law" (1981) 31:2 UTLJ 200.
27. I am grateful to Brian Langille and Brent Cotter, a former member of the Dalhousie law faculty
and author of a chapter in the first edition of Employment Law, for their recollections of Innis' position
on this point.
28. See e.g. L Vosko, N Zukewich & C Cranford, "Precarious Jobs: A new typology of employment"
(October 2003) 4:10 Perspectives 16; and for international comparisons see A Supiot, Beyond
Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001); Katherine Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing
Workplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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lower entitlements. Because of this fluidity in the status and rights of
workers, labour law ought to be able to manage transitions, reconcile
anomalies and cope with ambiguities. But it can do none of these things
well if its administrators, subjects and beneficiaries inhabit multiple policy
domains, each regulated by a distinct legal regime.29
A second consideration of equal or greater importance: disparities and
discontinuities amongst common law, collective bargaining and statutory
employment regimes create incentives for employers to "game the
system" to the prejudice of their workers. By resisting unionization they
can hire people more cheaply under individual contracts; by not offering
them standard employment conditions, they can hire them more cheaply
yet; and by sending work down the supply chain, to a subcontractor or
offshore, they can avoid hiring workers altogether, escape all forms of
labour regulation and achieve even lower "labour" costs-which is why
employers have been doing all of these things with increasing frequency.
Understanding labour law as an integrated system, I argue, might go some
way towards preventing such tactics. If so, it might also lead unionists
to see statutory regulation of the workplace as complementary to and
supportive of collective bargaining, rather as a poor substitute for it.30
Finally, the persistence of distinct regimes of labour law-common
law, collective bargaining and statutory-helps to obscure, and thus to
reinforce, inequality amongst groups of workers. To overstate slightly,
high status managerial and professional workers benefit considerably from
employee-friendly rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada; private sector
construction, transportation and manufacturing workers and public sector
workers are able to secure favourable wages and working conditions
through collective bargaining; but many Canadian workers-unskilled,
casual or part-time workers, service and clerical workers-must settle
for the minimal protections they receive from under-resourced labour
inspectorates charged with enforcing often-outdated labour standards
legislation;" and, parenthetically, domestic and agricultural workers
must in practice settle for none-of-the-above.32 Now the key point: the
29. For a variety of perspectives on this point see G Davidov & B Langille, Boundaries and Frontiers
ofLabour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
30.
Harry Arthurs, "Reconciling Differences Differently: Reflections on Labor Law and Worker
Voice After Collective Bargaining" (2007) 28 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 155.
31. These deficiencies are documented in my report Fairnessat Work: FederalLabour Standardsfor
the 21st Century (Ottawa: HRSDC, 2006) and in the research studies that accompanied it.
32. See e.g. Jonah Butovsky & Murray E G Smith "Beyond Social Unionism: Farm Workers in
Ontario and Some Lessons from Labour History" (Spring 2007) 59 Labour 69 at 76-78; Abigail Bakan
& Daiva Stasiulus, eds, Not One of the Family: Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1997).
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demography of each of these groups differs considerably. White males
predominate in managerial and professional cadres and male semiskilled workers in most private sector unions. Women are prominent in
public sector unions, but, along with people of colour and immigrants,
are overrepresented in the service sector and, of course, in the non-waged
work of social reproduction. Thus, because different groups of workers
are covered by labour law regimes of differing ambition and efficacy,
labour law may operate to reinforce gender, racial and class inequality in
Canadian society.33 To say that "labour law is a subset of employment law"
is to remind ourselves that we must measure our system of employment
regulation by what it does to help the weakest, not the strongest, members
of the workforce. An integrated approach to employment law would enable
us to see this more clearly.
Against this background I can now sum up what I conceive to be Innis'
great achievement. By exploring the common law of employment and the
statutory regimes that regulate employment relations, and by charting
their relationship to collective labour law, he redrew our mental map of
this whole legal domain. But Innis was a pragmatic person, not a grand
visionary. He effectively redrew our map of labour law in much the same
way as, say, the Basque fishermen who fished for cod off the coast of
Newfoundland revised everyone's knowledge of the Atlantic. Until the
publication of Employment Law In Canada, academic and professional
lawyers operated with a map on which the law governing individual
employment relations was essentially located in a blank space quaintly
labelled "heer bee monsters." Innis removed that label, and by sketching
in the main features of that space reminded us that it was inhabited by
flesh-and-blood workers who needed and deserved the law's attention.
Without this initiative, we could neither identify the winds, reefs and
cross-currents that make labour policy so problematic, nor find our way
to our ultimate destination: justice in the workplace. But in case you think
that I have arrived at my own ultimate destination, the end of this lecture,
I have to ask you to be patient for a few more minutes.
IV. New maps of labourlaw
While Innis enlarged the boundaries of the known world, he did not capture
it in its entirety. In this next part of my lecture, I want to describe three
33. See e.g. David Beatty, "Ideology, Politics and Unionism" in Kenneth P Swan & Katherine
Swinton, eds, Studies in Labour Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) 299 at 301-21; Anne Forrest,
"How Labour Relations Policy and Law Perpetuate Women's Economic Inequality" (Spring/Summer
2004) 23:3/4 Can Woman Stud 64; Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, "The Legacy of PC 1003" (1995)
3 CLELJ 357.
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recent attempts to complete, or at least complement, Innis' work by filling
in the remaining unknown spaces on the map of labour law.
V. Maps of smallplaces: legalpluralism and the law of the workplace
The first such attempt began by altering the scale of the map. Instead of
charting hemispheres and continents, oceans and mountains, this new map
began by minutely describing workplaces. There was a certain logic in this
new approach. Workplaces are where all forms of labour law intersect:
individual and collective labour law, constitutional norms and regulatory
statutes, formal contracts and quotidian customs. However, the results
of this intersection are unpredictable and vary from one workplace to
another. Sometimes, no doubt, workers and employers behave precisely
as legislatures, regulators, courts and labour lawyers imagine they will.
However, this is relatively rare. Almost always there will be an overlay of
private, informal and often implicit understandings about how everyday
life is to be conducted in that workplace.34 Quite frequently, those
understandings will transgress the formal requirements of state law though
sometimes they will replicate, reinforce or extend them. This notion that
the parties to an employment relationship create their own "web of rule" is
well known in the literature of industrial relations; is the central insight of
"legal pluralism," one of the most important post-modem legal theories;
and is in fact supported by all regimes of state labour law that allow space
for the parties to negotiate and administer the terms of their relationship. 1
But for all its descriptive power, "the law of the workplace" lacks
normative, analytical or explanatory power. It does not tell us whether
prevailing workplace norms are just or unjust; it does not explain why one
particular hierarchy of norms has come to prevail in any given workplace,
rather than another; and it does not offer an overall account of the formative
influences that shape employment relations and labour law in our society.
In the end its virtues of small scale and close attention to detail turn out to
be its greatest weakness.
VI. Maps of law ' empire: the constitutionalizationof labour law
The same cannot be said of the next attempt to locate labour law on the
larger map of the juridical world. Old maps used to colour whole continents
pink in order to signify that they belonged to the British Empire. Likewise,
contemporary maps of social and legal relationships tend to regard many
34. Harry Arthurs, "Understanding Labour Law: The Debate Over 'Industrial Pluralism"' (1985)38
Curr Legal Probs 83.
The literature is reviewed in Harry Arthurs, "Landscape and Memory": Labour Law, Legal
35.
Pluralism and Globalization in T Wilthagen, ed, Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial
Relations in a Global Context (Amsterdam: North Holland Press, 1998) at 21 ff.
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of them as possessions or dependencies of constitutional law. But it is no
more useful, in my view, to comprehend labour law as a mere province of
constitutional law than it was to understand India as a colony of the United
Kingdom. Of course, one can understand the appeal of colouring labour
law "constitutional." Those who favour this approach mean to convey
that the most cherished values of our society-equality, dignity, security,
freedom of assembly and association-should permeate the workplace
where most of us spend most of our lives. 6 Moreover, they intend that those
values should be translated into constitutional rights, legally enforceable
by aggrieved workers. And finally, they hope and believe that if we follow
this approach, the courts will be able to transform employment from a
relationship of power to a relationship of justice, and to do so without the
unpleasantness that accompanies political struggle, social mobilization or
economic redistribution.
If only that is what a map of labour law looked like! But alas it
does not. Put aside the notorious expense, uncertainty and inefficacy of
constitutional litigation-though these are all good reasons to resist the
constitutionalization of labour law." Consider only what I am going to
suggest is a fair, if un-nuanced, reading of Canada's constitutional texts
and the Supreme Court of Canada's labour law jurisprudence.
Under our Charter of Rights and Freedoms, workers enjoy the
procedural freedoms of association and expression. 8 But their
rights do not include substantive rights to a job, to receive
decent remuneration or to have a voice in the management of the
enterprise."
36. David Beatty, Putting The Charterto Work: Designinga ConstitutionalLabour Code (Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987); Roy Adams, "From Statutory Right to Human Right: The
Evolution and Current Status of Collective Bargaining" (2008) 12 Just Labour 48; Guy Davidov,
"Judicial Development of Collective Labour Rights-Contextually" (2010) 15:2 CLELJ 235; and
c.f. Alan Hyde, "Exclusion is Forever: How Keeping Labour Rights Separate from Constitutional
Rights Has Proven To Be a Bad Deal for American Trade Unions and Constitutional Law" (2010) 15:2
CLELJ 25.
37. For an extended critique see Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, Does the Charter Matter? (2006)
11:1 Rev Const Stud 37; HarryArthurs, "The Constitutionalization of Employment Relations: Multiple
Models, Pernicious Problems" (2010) 19:4 Soc & Leg Stud 403; Harry Arthurs, "Constitutionalizing
the Right of Workers to Organize, Bargain and Strike: The Sight of One Shoulder Shrugging" (2010)
15:2 CLELJ 273.
38. Health Services andSupport - FacilitiesSubsector BargainingAssociation v British Columbia,
2007 SCC 27 at paras 2 and 91, [2007] 2 SCR 391; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union,
Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8 at paras 3 and 32-37, [2002] 1
SCR 156.
39. Judy Fudge, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively: The
Implications of the Health Services andSupport case in Canada and Beyond" (2008) 37:1 Indus LJ 25
at 32-35.
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*

The Charter also protects workers against abuses by state, as
opposed to private, actors. 40 However, in the employment context,
most abuses are perpetrated by private actors, not state actors.

*

Workers enjoy quasi-constitutional protection under human rights
law not to be discriminated against on a variety of enumerated
and "analogous" grounds. 1 But neither the Charternor human
rights law protects against the one ground of discrimination that
characterizes all workplaces: discrimination on the ground of
subordinate economic status. 42

*

The judicature provisions of our constitution require that courts
control the interpretation and application of labour laws and the
procedures of labour tribunals. 43 But courts have been consistently
unable or unwilling to acknowledge the unique dynamic of
employment relations or to tolerate interpretations and procedures
that deviate from the judicial model.

*

Under the federalism provisions of our constitution, employment
is presumptively local, private and contractual in nature. Only by
exception does it become a matter of national concern, engage
societal interests, and warrant regulatory intervention."

*

And, finally, under our unwritten economic constitution-which,
I argue, is "similar in principle" to that of the United Stateslabour markets are deemed to operate naturally and optimally
when they are unregulated, and enterprises when management
enjoys maximum flexibility to deploy and direct the workforce

40. Peter W Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of CanadaStudent Edition (Toronto: Thompson Reuters
Canada Ltd., 2010) at 37 if.
41. Vriendv Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at paras 67-82 and 150-53.
42. Several Canadian human rights statutes do prohibit discrimination on grounds of "social
condition" or "social origin." See e.g. Human Rights Act, RSNB 1973, c H-ll, ss 2 and 3(1) which
defines "social condition" as "the condition of inclusion of the individual in a socially identifiable
group that suffers from social or economic disadvantage on the basis of his or her source of income,
occupation or level of education." See also CharterofHuman Rights and Freedoms,RSQ c C-12, s 10;
Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c 18, ss 1(1) and 5(1); Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1,
s 9(1). And see Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, Adding Social Condition to the Canadian Human
Rights Act (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2009) at 21-27.
43. See Crevier v Qudbec (Attorney General), [1981] 2 SCR 220; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9 at paras 31, 52-55 and 68, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
44. Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider, [1925] AC 396; Attorney-General of Canada v
Attorney-General of Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] AC 326; Reference re Anti-Inflation
Act (Canada), [1976] 2 SCR 373, 68 DLR (3d) 452; Gordon DiGiacomo, "The Federal Treaty
Implementation and International Labour Agreements" (2004) 11 CLELJ 31; Thomas S Kuttner,
"Federalism and Labour Relations in Canada" (1997) 5 CLELJ 195.
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as it sees fit. 4 5 These unwritten "constitutional" principles of free
markets and unfettered managerial discretion are similar to the
principles of parliamentary government that derive from the fact
that we have a political "constitution similar in principle to that of
the United Kingdom." No one is quite sure where they came from,
precisely what their content is, how they can be revised or why
they are understood to be quasi-binding despite being unwritten
and non-justiciable; 4 6 but they are very hard to ignore.
One would be ill-advised, then, to use the constitutional map to
navigate the turbulent seas of labour law and policy.
VII. Maps of the economy: labourlaw as the law of labour market
regulation.
This brings me to a third attempt to map labour law, one that borrows its
coordinates not from sociology or constitutional law but from political
economy. The argument runs this way: like all law, labour law has its
foundations in the deep structures of political economy. Consequently,
how power is organized and wealth is distributed significantly determine
the main direction and material outcomes of labour law, if not its detailed
content and form. Or to put this point the other way around, public policies
and legal strategies that ignore the realities and assumptions of wealth and
power are unlikely to succeed.
Let me offer a few examples. The explosion of employment law
litigation in the 1980s can best be understood not as a response by
powerless employees to the offer of new judge-made rights, but rather
as a response by judges to the demands of a new affluent, assertive and
influential class of privileged knowledge workers.4 7 Another example: we
can understand the widespread failure to comply with, enforce or update
employment standards legislation as confirmation of the fact that ordinary
unorganized blue-and white-collar workers lack both individual market

45. Some empirical evidence in support of this notion is found in Harry Glasbeek, "Afterword:
Looking Back" in supranote 20 at 393. See also Michael MacNeil, "Freedom of Association in a Free
Enterprise System: Wal-Mart in Jonquibre" (2010) 15 CJELJ [forthcoming].
46. Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (PatriationReference), [1981] 1 SCR 753;
Jean Leclair, "Canada's Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles" (2002) 27 Queen's LJ
389; Mark D Walters, "The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as
Fundamental Law" (Spring 2001) 51 UTLJ 91.
47. As modest confirmation of this point, topics dealt with in the SSRN list of Top Ten All Time
Hits for Labor: Public Policy and Regulation (January 2 1997 to August 21 2010) include executive
compensation (4); immigrant entrepreneurs (2); the job market for law clerks (1); women in the
boardroom (1) and labor standards (2).

14 The Dalhousie Law Journal
power and collective political influence. 48 And yet another: we can attribute
the obsolescence of collective bargaining law not simply to lack of expert
advice or to legislative inattention but rather to the failure of the labour
movement to maintain working class solidarity, to build strong political
alliances with other groups or to invent new direct action strategies to
counter the advantages that employers gained through globalization. 49
If these examples persuade you that political economy may indeed
help us to understand labour law-to draw a more accurate map of labour
law-what might such a map look like? Its primary aim would be to
chart the plate tectonics of dynamic labour markets, rather than the smallscale detail of individual employment relations, the local topography
of workplaces and enterprises or the winds and currents of laws and
constitutions-though there would be room for all of these as well.
And why labour market tectonics? Because labour markets are
regulated by powerful forces of political economy that are invisible, or at
least unmarked on conventional maps of labour law. International trade
and investment law, for example, has fundamentally restructured our
economy by facilitating the export of Canadian corporate head-office jobs
to the United States and of manufacturing jobs to developing countries
with lower labour standards, as well as the importation into Canada of
foreign goods, capital, corporate human resources practices and neoliberal policy prescriptions. Tax law also regulates the labour market in
important ways. For example, it provides incentives and disincentives
for job-creation in the private sector, permits corporations to minimize
their contributions to the social welfare state, allows government to hire
or forces it to fire large numbers of workers, subsidizes pension provision
and job training by employers, and provides incentives for workers to
become "self-employed" and renounce their coverage under protective
labour legislation. The social welfare laws that establish entitlements
to publicly-funded health care, social housing, pensions, daycare and
education obviously affect the well-being of workers and their families.
Without such schemes, workers would have to buy these services at market
prices from their own earnings, leaving them increasingly vulnerable
to employer pressure. Immigration law is important to labour market
regulation because Canadian businesses rely heavily on skilled workers
from abroad, and because Canada uses immigration law to regulate the
wages and working conditions of domestic, agricultural and other workers

48. 1have explored this notion in my report Fairnessat Work: FederalLabourStandardsfor the 21st
Century (Ottawa: HRSDC, 2006).
49. Arthurs, "Labour Law After Labour," supranote 5.
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who come to this country on temporary work permits. One last example:
corporations, securities, intellectual property and insolvency laws define
important aspects of the employment relationship, not least whether
workers' interests must be taken into account in the calculus of corporate
decision-making, how workers' long-term intellectual and physical
"investments" in an enterprise will be valued and protected, and how the
savings they accumulate in pension and benefit plans will be used (or not)
to ensure worker-friendly outcomes in capital markets."o
I have tried to show how the individual and collective bargaining power
of workers is profoundly affected not just by labour law, but by the entire
system of political economy that shapes labour market outcomes, as well
as political outcomes. The most important labour law decision of the US
Supreme Court in the past fifty years-I argue-was its recent holding that
Congress cannot limit political expenditures by corporations." Laws are
made by elected legislators; the judges who interpret them are appointed
by elected presidents. If corporations can dominate the electoral process
through their control of campaign financing, labour will have little chance
of securing favourable labour legislation and little prospect of winning
cases before sympathetic judges.
I believe that I have made a persuasive case for constructing a new
map of labour law. However, I am sure that I will be told that such a
project is both conceptually flawed and impractical to execute. Let me
respond to these objections.
The conceptual flaw first. "If everything is labour law," someone will
say, "then nothing is." That is fairly easy to answer. What I am suggesting is
that we replace labour law not with a totally open-ended subject-"the law
of everything"-but with one I propose to call "the law of labour market
regulation."52 There are other titles I could think of: European scholars
talk of "social law" for example;5 3 or one might imagine a subject called
"the law of economic power and subordination." 54 But to me, the "law of
labour market regulation" does the job well enough: if legal concepts, rules

50. Harry Arthurs & Claire Mummd, "From Governance To Political Economy: Insights From A
Study Of Relations Between Corporations And Workers" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 439.
51. Citizens United v FederalElection Commission, 130 S Ct 876 (US 2010).
52. The nomenclature is not mine. See S Deakin & F Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market:
Industrialization,Employment and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Arup
et al, eds, Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction,Constitution and
Regulationof Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006).
53. See e.g. Mauro Zamboni, "The 'Social' In Social Law: An Analysis of a Concept in Disguise"
(2008) 9 JL & Soc'y 63.
54. See e.g. Alan Hyde, "What is Labour Law?" in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, Boundaries
and Frontiers of LabourLaw (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006).
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or institutions affect labour market outcomes in some material way, and
if those outcomes ultimately influence the rights and interests of workers,
then their influence should be documented by labour scholars, understood
by labour law students, litigated by labour law practitioners, and taken into
account especially by those who design public policies and enact the laws
that give them effect.
Now the practical objection to my proposal: lawyers practice, students
study and scholars publish in an economy where time is scarce and
resources are limited. It is therefore unrealistic to insist that the hallmark
of professional due diligence, success in law school examinations and
excellence in legal scholarship is whether we have skilfully used the
coordinates of political economy in order to navigate the new map of
labour law. My critics will continue: even admitting that immigration or
insolvency law or trade or tax law do influence labour market outcomes
and, ultimately, the rights and interests of workers, labour lawyers should
stick to what they know best, and leave these other areas to people who
have a different sort of expertise.
These are compelling practical arguments. However, if we insist on
using the old map of labour and employment law rather than the new map
of labour market regulation, we risk purveying legal remedies to clients
who in fact are in need of economic power; we risk investing in legal
strategies no one can afford rather than in more cost-effective forms of
political and social mobilization; we risk teaching students about twigs,
branches and trees when they have to understand forests and ecosystems;
and we risk proposing band-aid statutory improvements or clever tricks
of constitutional magic when only fundamental changes in our political
economy will make a difference. No legal advice can ultimately be
useful-I argue-no legal recourse can be effective, no intellectual insight
can be valid, no change in law and policy can be justified if it does not rest
on a broad and deep comprehension of the issues in all their complexity.
That is why we need to design our new map of labour law around the
concept of labour market regulation.
Conclusion
I am not sure that Innis Christie would agree with much of what I have said
this evening. In fact, I am pretty sure he would not do so. He was a sensible
and fair person who did a great deal of practical good in the world, and
a sharp thinker who stimulated a lot of fine young minds and kept his
friends and colleagues on their toes-as many here can testify. But Innis
never published anything resembling a manifesto. He seldom nailed his
theoretical colours to the mast, and he generally undertook navigational
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tasks in order to get from here to there, not to make his reputation as a
cartographer. Nonetheless, and perhaps despite himself, it was Innis
who made the crucial discovery. After he published Employment Law in
Canada,the rest of us had to face up to the fact that our old map of labour
law had to be redrawn. My lecture has been intended to trace the steps in
that process and to honour Innis for the intrepid and intuitive seamanship
that launched us on a voyage of discovery that has not ended yet, and
likely never will.

